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Abstract
This article reviews the performance of the Fijian econ-
omy from 2015 to 2019. After several years of decent
growth (around 5%), GDP growth fell to as low as 0.5%
in 2019. Earlier hopes that a ‘new normal’ of GDP
growth of around 5% per annum had been established
have faded. The principle reason for this, it is argued, is
a lack of business confidence, which is associated with
the 2018 elections, but more fundamentally with a lack
of faith in Fiji's political system. At the same time, the
government has also been forced to embark on a course
of fiscal consolidation, as announced in the 2019–2020
National Budget, due to disappointing revenue
collections and undisciplined expenditure in earlier
years. The banking sector is hamstrung by a lack of
liquidity. This article is written to understand the Fijian
economy pre-COVID-19, but with the sharp downturn
in economic growth in particular due to the impact of
the COVID-19 virus on tourism—Fiji's most important
sector—and no room for fiscal expansion, growth
prospects in Fiji are currently not bright. An improved
medium-term outlook will require greater confidence
(both political and economic) to increase investment,
both foreign and domestic. Reforms to reduce the costs
of doing business will also help.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Fiji's economy grew by only 0.5% in 2019, following growth of 3.5% in 2018, a downturn
compared to the 5.6%, 4.7% and 5.4% in 2014, 2015 and 2017, respectively (growth in 2016 was
slower due to Cyclone Winston). Pre-COVID-19, the growth forecast for 2020 was 1.7%, and for
2021 2.9% (Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2020b). Of course, these forecasts, especially for 2020 and
probably for 2021, have already been reduced due to the impact of COVID-19, with −4.3%
growth projected for the current year as at May 2020. But even putting COVID-19 to one side,
as this survey does, the country's recent growth performance suggests poor growth prospects. In
late 2019, the Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) forecast trend growth to be around 2.9 to 3% from
2021 onwards (Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2019, p. 34).
With weak growth, and disappointing revenue outcomes, the fiscal consolidation
announced in the 2019–20 National Budget (delivered in June 2019) with steep expenditure cuts
was inevitable given high government borrowing over the past 5 years. Previous budgets (partic-
ularly in the pre-election years of 2014 and 2018) had been used as a tool to gain at the polls,
and the need for fiscal adjustment has been obvious since 2015. As Table 3 later in the article
shows, the government is now being forced to cut back on vital expenditures for education,
health and infrastructure, areas that the government itself has continuously identified as priori-
ties. Due to the low-growth scenario, the revenue challenge facing the government is not a
cyclical but a structural one.
The higher growth of around 5% observed a few years ago had been heralded as a ‘new
normal’ for Fiji. What explains the growth slowdown? Prior to COVID-19, tourism continued to
play a dominant role in maintaining economic growth. Activity in other important sectors
such as sugarcane, timber, gold and sugar, however, has remained restrained. Moreover, as gov-
ernment has been forced to reduce expenditure, the contribution of government spending to
growth has contracted.
The fundamental cause for the slowdown, however, is that the Fijian economy has been
impacted by weak business and investor sentiment on account of both policies and politics.
Business confidence started falling in June 2018, just ahead of the national elections of
November 2018. There was no bounce back in confidence after the elections. Indeed, a year
later business confidence had fallen to its lowest since 2009, and even the RBF noted that
weaker demand in 2019 ‘reflect[ed] subdued consumption activity and contraction in
investment, stemming largely from weak business and investor sentiments’ (Reserve Bank of
Fiji, 2019, p. 34). Restoring business confidence will not be easy, and, for reasons discussed, will
be unlikely until the next election in November 2022, and even then there is no guarantee. With
COVID-19 dealing a harsh blow to tourism, and no room for fiscal expansion, growth prospects
in Fiji are currently not bright.
This article is written to document and explain the pre-COVID-19 slowdown in economic
growth, and related fiscal developments. While of course the pandemic has acted as a major
shock, it is not the focus of this survey. To increase trend growth, Fiji will not only need to
recover from a pandemic-induced global depression, but also learn the lessons of the past.
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The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent economic
growth performance in the past 5 years and the short-term outlook. Section 3 provides reasons
for the growth slowdown, with a focus on the role of politics and business confidence in
economic outcomes. Fiscal developments and government debt are deliberated in Section 4.
Section 5 provides a discussion on bank lending, and declining bank liquidity, a major topic of
political debate and economic discussion in Fiji. Section 6 focuses on tourism and merchandise
trade. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
2 | ECONOMIC GROWTH
After relatively stronger growth outcomes of 5.6%, 4.7% and 5.4% in 2014, 2015 and 2017,
respectively, Fiji's economy has slowed down since 2018 (Figure 1). A lower growth of 2.5% was
recorded in 2016. Tropical Cyclone (TC) Winston had a negative impact on GDP; but post-
cyclone reconstruction partly financed by increased foreign aid provided a stimulus, and
consumption expenditure was strong in 2016 due to withdrawals of about $275 million by
impacted households from the Fiji National Provident Fund.1 In 2017, growth significantly
improved (up to 5.4%) largely on the back of the service sector, though primary sectors such as
fishing, forestry and mining were sluggish.
However, the growth momentum of 2017 did not continue into 2018, which recorded
growth of 3.5% that year. There was a further slowdown to 2019 with estimated growth of only
0.5%. Prior to COVID-19, which is having a devastating impact on tourism in Fiji, the country's
most important sector, a sluggish recovery was forecast for 2020 and 2021 with growth antici-
pated to increase to 1.7% in 2020 and 2.9% in 2021 and onwards (Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2020a).
What explains the post-2017 growth slowdown? Industrial growth has been sluggish. The
contribution of manufacturing to GDP has reduced from 10.7% in 2015 to an expected 10.4% in
2020. At the sectoral level, the annual industrial production index shows that out of Fiji's seven
key private industrial sectors, only three have grown significantly since 2014 (Figure 2).
Between September 2018 and September 2019, six of the eight sectors show negative growth in
the annual industrial production index (Figure 3).
The share of agriculture in GDP is about 6.5%. Policy support and fundamental structural
changes are needed for the agriculture sector, where the majority of the poor are concentrated.
In the medium to long term, the government must strive to achieve food security through
FIGURE 1 Real GDP
growth rate (2013–2019).
GDP, gross domestic product.
Source: Fiji Bureau of
Statistics and Reserve
Bank of Fiji
1All figures in this article are in Fiji dollars.
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investments to increase the productivity, sustainability and resiliency of agriculture. There must
be special targeting among smallholder farmers, many of whom live in absolute poverty. Small-
holder farmers are also extremely vulnerable to weather shocks.
The sugar industry continues to contract (Figures 2 and 3). Production of sugar in 2018
was only 60% of the 2014 level (Figure 2) and there was a further 10% fall in 2019
(12 months to September). The 2019–2020 budget continues existing but controversial
measures to prop up the sugar industry such as spending on cane access roads, the fertiliser
subsidy, the weedicide subsidy and cane cartage from Rakiraki to Rarawai mill. However, it
is apparent that policy tweaks will not work if the fundamentals within the industry are
weak. The nature of property rights governing the use of land has been one of the major
factors responsible for the decline of the industry. Until there are major reforms related to
land use and availability, sugarcane or agriculture in general will continue to be unattractive
for investment, both in terms of capital and labour. Budget documents mention Land Bank
as a reform but it is unclear at this stage how land that is deposited under Land Bank
changes the notion of land as a bundle of rights.
FIGURE 2 Annual industrial production index (base: 2014 = 100). Figures in square brackets are weights
for the sector/industry. Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics
FIGURE 3 Percentage
change in annual industrial
production index. Figures in
square brackets are weights
for the sector/industry.
Source: Fiji Bureau of
Statistics
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The underlying incentives for quality private investment have long been an issue in Fiji.
Since 2008, the government's medium-term target has been to raise investment above 25% of
GDP. However, this target was only achieved once, in 2013 (Figure 4). Since then investment
has been stuck at 18–20%, falling to 14% in 2018. In 2019, commercial bank lending for con-
sumption purposes and investment purposes both declined, the latter by 16.7% (Reserve Bank
of Fiji, 2020a). From the RBF Economic Review (January 2020), this contraction has been
mainly driven by the real estate and the building & construction sectors, important parts of the
investment side of the economy. Similarly, new loans for consumption purposes declined by
4.8% during this period. This contraction was not only because households borrowed less for
consumption purposes but also due to the wholesale, retail, hotels & restaurants sectors as well
(Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2020a).
3 | REASONS FOR FIJI 'S GROWTH SLOWDOWN
The way investors, businesses and households view the economy has important implications
for economic outcomes as their expectations are drivers of consumption and investment.
Changes in expectations due to changing politics and policies will therefore have an impact on
economic growth. Policies and politics can be expected to have an effect on both short- and
medium-term economic confidence, and thus on economic outcomes. In terms of investor con-
fidence, Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that political instability creates an uncertain political
and economic environment that raises risks and reduces investment. Political instability creates
an environment that translates into lower private borrowing and investment if it increases the
uncertainty faced by consumers, businesses and investors.
The uncertainty induced by the lead up to and outcomes of the 2018 general election is
the key reason behind the slowdown in the Fijian economy, as it is the likely explanation
for the fall in the country's investment rate. Business confidence has been falling after June
2018, ahead of the national election. However, the RBF only explicitly noted this in
November 2019. Data from RBF's Business Expectation Survey shows that overall business
confidence had fallen both in terms of expectations for the next 6 months and the next
12 months in December 2018. By June 2019, business confidence for the next 12 months had
fallen to its lowest since 2009.
It would seem that the successful conclusion of Fiji's first post-coup elections in 2014
increased business confidence, and boosted growth. However, the apparent diminution of the
FIGURE 4 Investment (% of GDP).
GDP, gross domestic product. Source:
Fiji Bureau of Statistics and Reserve
Bank of Fiji
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ruling party's popularity and the rise of a popular alternative in the 2018 elections have
increased uncertainty.
Another reason for the growth slowdown may relate to the costs of doing business in Fiji. In
May 2016, Fiji suspended the operations of Data Bureau Limited. This was Fiji's only operating
data bureau and the suspension limited access to credit information. The Fair Reporting of
Credit Act which eventually abolished the Data Bureau Limited was passed by the Fiji Parlia-
ment in April 2016 and came in force on May 26, 2016. While the new act is expected to provide
the legal framework for credit reporting agencies, it is not yet clear whether it is in operation,
and no new credit bureau has been created to take the place of Data Bureau Limited. The
resulting lack of information on borrowers may have increased the probability of more loans
being declined or lengthened the loan approval process, thus contributing to Fiji's investment
and growth slowdown. Fiji fell in the World Bank Doing Business rank in 2020 with regards to
getting credit, where it is now ranked 165 from 190 countries, down from 161 in 2019 (see
Table 1; World Bank, 2019, 2020).
4 | FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT
The fiscal consolidation announced in the 2019–20 National Budget (delivered in June 2019) is
clearly linked to the weak growth outlined above, but also to how the government has been
spending and borrowing over the past 5 years. Between the 2016–17 and current fiscal years,
government revenue as a percentage of GDP has hovered within a range of 27–28% (see
Table 1). Income tax holidays and tax incentives have hurt direct taxes and there is a need to
broaden the tax base. Due to the low growth scenario, the revenue challenge facing the govern-
ment is not a cyclical but a structural one.
Since 2012, the government has not been able to meet its budget revenue targets. One of the
main reasons for this is the projection of asset sales which never materialise, but are nonethe-
less budgeted again for the following year. For example, expressions of interest for the sale of
Energy Fiji Limited (EFL) shares were first advertised in March 2015 and then in September
2016. The government has repeatedly budgeted for the sale of FEA shares: $250 million in
2016–17, $371 million in 2017–18, $395 million in 2018–19 and $80 million in the 2019–20 bud-
get. More generally, in 2015, receipts from the sale of assets fell around $200 million short of
the $507 million planned for that year. $371 million worth of asset sales was predicted for the
2017–18 budget year but only $0.6 million were realised. As a result, the government had to
reduce actual expenditure by around $480 million in the 2017–18 budget.
While revenue has been stuck at 27–28% of GDP, expenditure has been in the range of
29–30% reaching as high as 33% of GDP in 2017–18 (Table 2). In the lead up to the 2018 general
election, the government seemed intent on attracting voters with giveaways without consider-
ation as to whether there were funds to pay for those in a sustainable and reasonable way.
While there could be a positive short-term effect from raising domestic demand, the quality of
such spending and its long-term impact on the economy is questionable.
More recently, as shown in Table 3, the government has been forced to cut back on vital
expenditures for education, health and infrastructure, areas that the government itself has con-
tinuously identified as priorities.
Between 2014–15 and 2017–18, government revenue grew by 61% whereas expenditure
went up by 71%. As a result, debt increased as well. As at December 2019, government debt
stood at $5.7 billion or 48% of GDP (see Table 4), up from 45.8% in July 2015. Given that the
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current government has been in power for 14 years, it can hardly blame its predecessors
for this.
As government debt has continued to grow, questions have been raised about the potential
medium- to long-term consequences (Chand, 2003; International Monetary Fund, 2016). The
International Monetary Fund has recently noted the need for fiscal adjustment over the medium
term to deliver on the objectives of lowering the public debt and strengthening the credibility of
the fiscal framework (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Historically, Fiji has not experienced
financing difficulties. Most of its debt is domestic (some 75% of the total—see Table 4). The
current debt ratio may therefore be regarded as ‘sustainable’ or ‘manageable’. However, a more
important question is the impact of debt burden on long-term economic growth prospects.
Recent research suggests that the current debt ratio is negatively impacting long-term economic
TABLE 2 Government revenue and expenditure ($ million)
2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020
Direct taxes 699.0 717.9 826.8 768.5 804.8
Indirect taxes 1,577.4 1,914.3 1,967.3 2090.8 2221.9
Value added tax 715.9 815.1 751.3 805.5 855.5
Customs duty 577.4 625.7 668.6 701.1 746.0
Service turnover tax 91.3 98.1 97.9 87.9 93.5
ECAL 31.0 77.5 150.5 164.8 174.1
Total revenue 2,908.3 2,896.3 3,224.4 3,256.1 3491.7
Total expenditure 3,292.0 3,105.1 3,742.2 3,664.9 3840.9
Total revenue
(% of GDP) – 27.1 28.3 26.9 27.4
Total expenditure
(% of GDP – 29.1 32.9 30.3 30.2
Nominal GDP N/A 10,648.3 11,361.3 12,063.7 12,703.8
Source: Economic and Fiscal Update: Supplement to the 2019–2020 Budget Address, Government of Fiji.
Note: In 2016, the government fiscal year changed from January to December to July to June, and there was no
GDP estimate for 2015–2016.
Abbreviations: ECAL, Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy; GDP, gross domestic product.
TABLE 1 Rankings on World Bank doing business topics (2020)
Topic Score (100) Rank (190)
Starting a business 73.6 163
Enforcing contracts 57.1 101
Paying taxes 71.1 101
Registering property 71.9 57
Getting credit 25.0 165
Dealing with construction permits 67.8 102
Getting electricity 72.8 97
Resolving insolvency 43.8 98
Source: Doing business 2020, World Bank, https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/fiji.
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growth (Gounder & Sami, 2019). This empirical study undertook a time series analysis of the
long-run and short-run impact of public debt on economic growth in Fiji from 1970 to 2014.
Using an augmented Solow growth modelling framework, this study found that public debt has
a negative impact on economic growth in the long run and short run.
More recently, the government has defended its fiscal policy by claiming that the mix of cap-
ital (investment) and operating expenditure has been skewed in favour of the former, which
has risen from 33% in 2014–15 to 41% in 2017–18. This is a good sign. However, the category of
capital expenditure includes payments such as Tourism Fiji marketing grants, and marketing
support to Fiji Airways and the Fiji International Golf Tournament. From an economic view-
point, these are not necessarily capital investments since they do not add to the capital stock of
the economy.
While there is no easily-identifiable optimal level of government debt for Fiji, given that Fiji
is a small open economy and is vulnerable to shocks of various kinds, a cautious approach is
warranted, and a relatively low level of government debt appropriate. Maintaining a lower level
of debt ensures the government has the ability or fiscal space to respond to regional and global
shocks to its financial position without necessitating any reduction in essential expenditure.
5 | BANK LENDING, LIQUIDITY AND THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
The RBF regulates and supervises all commercial bank operations in Fiji. Fiji's financial sector
is profoundly bank-dominated (Gounder & Sharma, 2012). The commercial banks hold 44% of
TABLE 4 Government debt ($ million)
Jul 2015 Jul 2016 Jul 2017 Jul 2018 Jul 2019 Dec 2019
Domestic debt 2,997.5 3,245.0 3,300.8 3,763.0 4,131.1 4,301.9
External debt 1,385.3 1,262.6 1,370.9 1,457.5 1,498.2 1,434.1
Total debt 4,382.8 4,507.7 4,671.7 5,220.5 5,629.3 5,735.9
Debt (% of GDP) 45.8 44.6 43.9 45.9 46.7 48.0
Source: Economic and Fiscal Update: Supplement to the 2019–2020 Budget Address, Government of Fiji.
TABLE 3 Expenditure of selected ministries, other entities and programs ($ million)
2017–2018 2018–2019 2019–2020 Change (2019/20–2018/19)
Ministry of Health 303.1 384.3 349.7 (34)
Ministry of Education 447.5 515.9 467.6 (48)
Fiji Roads Authority 382.7 563.1 419.4 (143)
Water Authority of Fiji 255.8 349.2 258.7 (90)
Fiji Police 143.1 193.5 177.7 (15)
Ministry of Infrastructure 115.6 165.2 89.6 (75)
Fiji Military Forces 92.1 103.2 95.9 (7)
Poverty Benefit Scheme 38.0 38.0 36.0 (2)
Social Pension Scheme 37.2 47.4 46.0 (1.4)
Source: Budget Estimates 2019–2020, Government of Fiji.
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total assets of the financial sector and are the major providers of credit to the private sector. As
at June 2018, the commercial banks' share of credit to the private sector was 76%. In total, there
are six commercial banks operating in Fiji. Of these, five are foreign owned.
The level of liquidity in the Fijian banking sector has attracted increased interest recently,
with Fiji's parliament witnessing intense debates on the subject. During 2011 to 2015, the main
concerns were about the high liquidity among banks, but more recently (late 2018 and early
2019), questions have been raised on the comparatively lower levels of liquidity. Looking
at components of bank deposits, there has been a reversal in the trend for government
deposits. Government deposit holdings fell by 16.7% in 2018, after a 33.6% growth in 2017.
This indicates the government is using up its deposits in the banking system, as a result of the
high level of expenditure in that election year as well as the shortfall of government revenue
in that year. The revenue forecast for 2018–19 was $4.2 billion, but the estimated actual
revenue collected was $3.2 billion. This led to increased borrowing and a drawdown on
government deposits.
Falling bank liquidity makes banks less likely to lend, and we saw in Section 2 that bank
lending has declined, though, as noted there, this is also linked to a lack of demand for loans
due to falling confidence. Bank lending rates have only increased modestly.
Existing empirical evidence indicates that bank specific factors are strong determinants of
liquidity in Fiji (Gounder & Gounder, 2019). This study finds that larger, more profitable and
better capitalised banks are likely to hold more liquidity or liquid assets. Moreover, the study
argues that bank liquidity increases with the higher capital adequacy of banks and higher bank
profitability. From the perspective of banks, this could be an attempt at being cautious in terms
of individual bank specific liquidity management. However, it could also be due to the inability
of banks to find satisfactory clients. In addition, Gounder and Gounder (2019) show that gov-
ernment debt securities have implications for the conduct of monetary policy and banking sec-
tor liquidity management.
6 | MERCHANDISE TRADE AND TOURISM
The merchandise trade deficit continues to grow (Figure 5), and merchandise imports are now
almost three times the value of merchandise exports. The merchandise trade deficit widened by
20% in 2018 alone due to growth in imports of 14.6% relative to growth in exports of 6.5%.
Aggregate merchandise exports are stagnant (Figure 5). In fact, all three of Fiji's top mer-
chandise exports—animal products, food, beverages, spirits and tobacco, and minerals—have
shown negative growth in recent years (Figure 6).
Tourism remains the largest contributor to GDP and foreign exchange earnings. Tourism
earnings grew by 4.5% in 2018 to $2,010.3 million, mainly due to higher earnings from the
United States, China, United Kingdom and Canada (Figure 7). Personal remittances grew by
5.8% in 2018 reaching $564.0 million. This record level of remittances contributes to
maintaining consumption and domestic demand in the short term, but continued net out-
migration may be a drag on economic growth.
Tariffs are one of the main instruments of trade policy tools. 49.5% of tariff lines have been
bound. While broader coverage of bindings increases tariff predictability, there remains a signif-
icant gap between the overall bound average of 40.2% and the simple average applied most
favoured nation (MFN) tariff of 11.2% (World Trade Organization, 2016). For agricultural pro-
ducts, the simple average bound rate is 40.6%. However, the actual applied MFN tariffs average
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on agricultural products is 12.5% and non-agricultural products are 11%. This gap between
bound rates and applied rates create the possibility that tariff rates can fluctuate between fiscal
years and thus impacting the price of imported merchandise products.
Two major trade policy agendas have been implemented in the past 5 years. Fiji's first Trade
Policy Framework was launched in 2015. It identifies key policy directions for the conduct of
trade in goods and services for the next 10 years (2015–2025). In addition, the Melanesian Free
Trade Agreement (MFTA) was signed in January 2017 and is currently open for ratification.
The MFTA expands the Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement to include trade in
services, labour mobility, investment and government procurement between Melanesian
countries. Apart from these, bilateral discussions are currently underway for the possibility of a
Fiji–China Free Trade Agreement. By contrast, Fiji has so far (alongside Papua New Guinea)
refused to sign the new regional trade agreement PACER Plus, which includes Australia and
New Zealand.
It is critically important for the Fijian Government to continue with the trade liberalisation
that it began in the 1980s. A reversal of trade policy in this area will not provide support for
broad-based economic growth. Between 2009 and 2014, some tariffs have been increased, and
others reduced (World Trade Organization, 2016). Fiji's past experience suggests that it should
FIGURE 5
Merchandise exports and
imports (total). [p] is
provisional. [p]* indicates
data is from January to
November. Source: Fiji
Bureau of Statistics
FIGURE 6 Top three merchandise
exports. [p] is provisional. [p]* indicates
data is from January to November.
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics
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not go back to an inward-oriented strategy by providing protection to domestic firms in order to
encourage production and employment (Gounder & Prasad, 2013). Moreover, for Fiji to con-
tinue to reap benefits from the global trading system, greater economic integration is necessary
(but not sufficient) to create opportunities to diversify the economy, tap into new comparative
advantages and increase jobs. One particular opportunity for Fijian firms through economic
integration is the opportunity to participate in global value chains (GVCs) and supply chains.
These not only provide opportunities to diversify exports and create new jobs but also obtain
new technological capabilities. GVCs can allow small and micro enterprises (SMEs), in particu-
lar, to access foreign markets. It can play a major role in reducing trade restrictions in services
and improve transport and communication logistics and infrastructure for SMEs. Nonetheless,
economic liberalisation should be accompanied by policies promoting economic diversification
and supporting/cultivating entrepreneurship which opens up broader opportunities for SMEs to
benefit from GVCs.
7 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
Accelerating growth in Fiji is critical. 28% of the population still lives in poverty (Fiji Bureau of
Statistics, 2015). While social protection can reduce the vulnerability of the poor to shocks and
contribute to equity, the government is severely constrained in terms of public finances, as this
survey has shown. In addition, the economy is vulnerable to weather-related and climate-
change shocks. Improvements in human welfare, sustained poverty reduction, and increased
reliance to shocks cannot be achieved in Fiji without a substantial increase in inclusive growth
and creating more jobs.
This article has examined Fiji's recent growth performance. Hopes that GDP growth could
be expected to be sustained at a level of around 5% have dissipated, with the disappointing
FIGURE 7 Export of travel and total services. [p] is provisional. [p]* indicates data is from January to
September. Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics
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growth of recent years. The article has argued that this is not a cyclical downturn, but a struc-
tural one, driven by reduced business confidence due to political uncertainty.
Even leaving COVID-19 to one side, improving Fiji's growth prospects will not be easy.
Achieving growth rates higher than 3% will require sustaining high levels of investment,
whether foreign or domestic, especially in agriculture and manufacturing. But there is no
easy way to improve investor confidence. Moreover, the government has no fiscal capacity
and is cutting expenditure. And now the economy has to deal with the severe COVID-19
shock.
In this constrained environment, improving domestic revenue collection and prioritising
expenditure will be important. Public investments also need to be executed effectively. Deeper
reforms are required to life productivity in areas related to property rights, local governance,
education, health, housing affordability and business environment. However, until confidence
in Fiji's political system is restored, growth is likely to be anaemic at best.
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